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Two-Stage Team Rent-Seeking: Experimental Analysis
Abstract

This paper presents a two-stage team rent-seeking model with a contest prize that is not excludable among
winning team members. When early effort is a perfect substitute for late effort, early actors can free ride on
their late-moving teammates. However, when early and late efforts are complements, all team members exert
positive effort levels. Asymmetries in early effort reduce effort choices for all late movers. The theory is tested
with laboratory experimental methods. Although subjects overinvest relative to the Nash equilibrium in all
treatments, chosen effort levels provide limited support for the model. Early movers exerted higher effort in
the complement treatment, and second-stage effort choices were broadly consistent with best response
functions. Surprisingly, in both single-shot and repeated play environments, early movers in the substitute
treatment did not free ride, choosing effort levels similar to those of late movers. [excerpt]
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1. Introduction
In his seminal contribution on rent-seeking activity,Tullock (1967,1980) develops a model
inwhich players choose effort levels to influence the chance they are awarded a prize. If player
effortdoes not contribute to the value of the prize, rent-seeking effortresults in a social welfare
loss and can be viewed as inefficient (see also Krueger 1974; Posner 1975). Most research
stemming from Tullock's model focuses on contests with simultaneously chosen effort levels
and inwhich the contest prize is awarded to only one contestant or group (see, e.g., Hillman
and Katz
1984; Appelbaum and Katz
Fullerton and McAffee 1999).
Many

real-world

contests

are more

1987; Snyder 1989; Nitzan
complicated.

For

example,

1991; Gradstein

congressional

elections

1993;
in

States typically involve two candidates that receive support from the two major
political parties. Both candidates and their parties benefit from a successful bid to capture
a seat, and there could be important connections between their effortdecisions. A high-quality
theUnited

challenger exerting effort early in an election cycle might receive greater party support by
demonstrating an ability to fare competitively in the election. Alternatively, an incumbent's
effortmight discourage a competitive challenge, freeingparty resources for other purposes. In
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this case, the timing of effort is important, and the contest "prize"
candidate

and

the candidate's

is awarded

to both the

party.

another example, many public policy issues are characterized by interest group
lobbying frommultiple groups on either side of an issue. Successful lobbying by theNational
As

for example, benefits other groups sharing theirpolicy preferences. In a sense,
issues
public policy
motivating lobbying effort can generate public prizes that affectmultiple
constituencies in differentways. An important aspect of these environments is their team

Rifle Association,

oriented nature, typically placing groups in one of two camps (for or against free trade, gun
control,

choice,

etc.).

This paper contributes to the literature on rent-seeking by developing and experimentally
testing a two-stage team rent-seekingmodel in which the contest prize is awarded to each
member of thewinning team. In one variant of themodel, aggregate team effortdetermines the
probabilities associated with the contest outcome. In this case, an individual team member's
effort serves as a perfect substitute for the effortof other teammembers. When effortdecisions
are sequenced, early movers have the potential to free ride on the effort choices of their later
moving teammates. This suggests that lobbying for public policy favors could be subject to the
same collective action problems associated with public goods provision. In a second variant of
themodel, the timing of effortmatters. In particular, early effortchoices shape the competitive
structure

of the contest,

and

in this case

early movers

cannot

free ride on

their

teammates.

The

theoretical results also show that effort levels are highest in "competitive contests," with any
asymmetries in early effort choices leading to reductions in effortby late-moving teammates.
The

theory is tested by laboratory experimental methods. A few authors have used
experimental methods to study rent-seeking (Milner and Pratt 1989, 1991; Shogren and Baik
1991; Davis and Reilly 1998; ?nc?ler and Croson 1998; Potters, de Vries, and Van Winden
1998). Typically, subjects are given an endowment that can be used to invest in a chance towin
a prize, with much of the research focusing on symmetric contests with simultaneous effort
choices. Generally, subjects tend to overinvest relative to equilibrium predictions, although this
tendency diminishes with experience and opportunities for repeated play within a subject
group.

The

in more

paper

is also

connected

to a small

but

growing

literature

that examines

rent-seeking

frameworks. Motivated

complicated
by models of research and development
Isaac
and
examine
the effects of group size and the degree to
Reynolds (1988)
expenditures,
which the contest prize is shared on individual investment decisions. They find that a shared
prize leads to less investment at the individual level.Anderson and Stafford (2003) examine the
effects of cost heterogeneity, group size, and an entry fee on subject participation and
expenditures. They find that increases in group size, heterogeneity in costs, and the presence of
an entry fee (whichmakes the decision-making exercise a two-stage game) decrease the number
of subjects choosing to participate in the contest. Consistent with theory, increases in group size
decrease individual expenditures but increase group expenditures. The use of an entry fee
typically reduced individual expenditures, but the results with respect to individual
expenditures under cost heterogeneity were mixed. Davis and Reilly (1998) add a "rent
defending buyer" who has a higher value for the contest prize than a group of rent-seeking
sellers. In some cases, the buyer bids against one sellerwho is thewinner of a first-stage seller
auction, which creates a two-stage game with heterogeneity in the contest prize. Generally,
a rent-defending buyer is able to reduce aggregate rent-seeking. In a later paper, Davis and
Reilly (2000) examine the effects of experience and adding additional rent-defending buyers,
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finding that the presence of additional buyers limits efficiency gains. They also find that that
experience has limited ability to reduce social costs or the variability of bids.
Below, I examine rent-seeking in a team environment with a sequential structure and
a contest prize that is not excludable among teammates. Consistent with existing research, in all
the

treatments,

show

results

experimental

overinvestment

significant

relative

to

the Nash

equilibrium prediction. Regarding the qualitative predictions of the model, the results are
mixed. Early-moving subjects chose higher effort levels when their late-moving teammate's
effort

served

as a complement

rather

a substitute.

than

Effort

choices

of

late movers

were

not

best responses in a game theoretic sense but did display patterns consistent with the shape of the
best response functions.Generally, late-moving subjects appear to have responded to the effort
levels of their early-moving opponents in the case of substitutable effort levels and to the effort
levels of their teammates when effort levels were complements. In contrast to the theoretical
predictions, however, early movers did not exploit opportunities to free ride in either single
shot or

repeated

play

treatments,

perhaps

reflecting

some

concern

for their

teammate's

payoff.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents themodel and
theoretical results; section 3 details the experimental design, procedures, and results; and
section

4 concludes.

2. The Model
Building on the basic structure inTullock (1980), consider the following two-stage rent
seeking game. In thefirst stage, two players simultaneously choose effort levels (x and y). These
choices are revealed to two second-stage players, who then simultaneously choose effort levels
(Zand Y). All players are assumed to be risk neutral, and have identical and constant marginal
cost of effort (C). The contest prize (B) is awarded to each member of thewinning team, with
each

team

consisting

of one

one

and

first-stage

to be nonnegative.1 The probability
function") is

second-stage

that team X wins

Px=

player.

Effort

levels

are

restricted

the contest (the "contest success

x+x
x + X+y+Y'

Assuming all players act to maximize expected payoffs, the objective functions for the
second-stage players (given the first-stage choices of x and y) are

U?x,X,y,Y)=x+Xx++Xy+YB-CX
and

Uy(x,X,y,Y)=?^

X~\~ A.

1
This restriction is consistent with many real-world policy environments. For example, ifmultiple groups lobby a policy
maker, a group acting later cannot reduce lobbying effort exerted previously.
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This leads to the following formulas forNash
X*X

?

~4C
=?

r

equilibrium spending in the second stage:
-x

*'

-v.
4C '

Substituting the second-stage equilibrium expenditure formulas into the objective functions of
the stage 1 players and simplifyingyields:
Ux

= ? ? Cx
2

and

This implies the subgame perfectNash equilibrium to this game has x* = y* = 0, and X* = Y*
= B14C.
Essentially, when the contest prize goes to both members of the winning team,
irrespective of their relative effort levels, first-stage players are able to shift the burden of effort
completely on their teammates. In anticipation of some of the experimental results to follow,
note also that the nonnegativity restrictionwould be binding for stage 2 players if the stage 1
players chose effort greater than Z?/4C. In this case, although stage 2 players would like to
reduce their team's effort, the best they can do is not add to it.
The results demonstrate that stage 1 players can free ride on the effort of their stage 2
counterparts. In equilibrium, each player equates themarginal benefit and marginal cost of
effort.When the contest prize is not excludable between teammates, stage 2 effort levels

influence the probability that both members of a team win the prize. Thus, an increase in stage
2 effort reduces themarginal benefit of further effort for both team members. With constant

marginal costs, and anticipating the effort level chosen in stage 2, the stage 1 player can free
ride, relying on the stage 2 teammate to bring themarginal benefit of effort for both team
members into equality with theirmarginal costs. In a sense, the shared nature of the prize
induces a collective action problem similar to those associated with the provision of public
goods. Whereas in the public goods case this is typically viewed as inefficient,free riding in the
rent-seeking case could be beneficial because it limitswasteful spending.
One limitation of the previous model is that the timing of effortdoes not matter?effort
exerted in stage 2 is a perfect substitute for stage 1 effort in the sense that both enter the contest
success

function

in exactly

the same

way.

In many

environments,

however,

early

effort

shapes

the structural characteristics of the contest. For example, in elections for theU.S. Congress,
early spending by a high-quality challenger can draw the attention of themajor political parties,
leading to significant party support as the election cycle closes. Alternatively, heavy spending
by an incumbent early in an election cycle may dissuade a high-quality challenger, leading to
a lopsided race that draws littleparty support. Although many contest success functions could
capture this feature, I chose to consider a modified version of the "natural advantage"
approach used by Snyder (1989). Snyder's paper considers the allocation of party spending
across several congressional districts that vary according to competitiveness or natural

advantage for one of the parties. Similar to the second-stage effortchoice results below, he finds
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that party spending levels should be high in competitive contests and low in contests inwhich
additional efforthas little effecton electoral probabilities. His approach, however, ignores the
effectof candidate spending and, as such, the interdependence of candidate and party spending.
In the present framework, stage 1 expenditures can be interpreted as candidate spending that
influences the natural advantage in a district.2 Specifically, let the probability that teamXwins
the contest be
x

our+(i-a)y'

with
a =

x+y

In this case, a determines the competitiveness of the contest, with values closer to 1 indicating
a greater advantage for teamX. If stage 1participants choose identical effort levels, a = Vi and
drops out of the expression forPx. However, when x > y, a > l/2,and the stage 2 effortof the
player on team X is given a higher weight than the stage 2 effort of the player on team Y?
Given the stage 1 effort levels,which determine oc,the objective functions of the stage 2 players
can

be

expressed

as

Ux(X,X,y,Y)=aX+^)YB-CX
and

vy(^y,r)=

Jil%YB-CY.

The expressions for equilibrium second-stage expenditures are

x -

(\-a)aB

C

and

(1-oQafl
C
=
Substituting the values forX*t and Y*? into the stage 1 objective functions yields (because X*
Y*, Px

=

a)

Ux(x,y)=-?-B-Cx

x+y

and

Uy(x9y)=^-B-Cy.
x+y

2

For more on this issue, see Cadigan
(2006).
3
Alternatively, the contest is a "weighted raffle," whereby stage 1 players determine the weights for the raffle. This
described in the section containing the experimental results.
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Solving for the equilibrium first-stage effort levels yields

4C
and

y = - 4C

/

= X* =
= Y* = B14C. In
Thus, the subgame perfect equilibrium has x*
y*
comparison with
success
contest
the
levels
for
2
effort
function, stage effort is unchanged,
equilibrium
previous
contrast
to
the previous results,when early effort influences the
but stage 1 effort is higher. In
competitiveness of the contest, stage 1 players cannot free ride: for stage 2 spending to be

effective, the stage 1 participant must exert effort. In equilibrium, stage 1 players match effort
=
V2,and the stage 2 decisions remain unchanged from the previous model inwhich
levels, oc
stage 1 players free ride.
As in Snyder (1989), the formulas forX* and y* demonstrate that aggregate stage 2 effort
ishighest when oc= Vi. Values of a far from Vi (which occur off the equilibrium path) create an

uncompetitive contest and generate reductions in effortby both advantaged and disadvantaged
stage 2 players. When stage 1 spending generates a clear advantage, the disadvantaged stage 2
player reduces effort because it is not as productive in affecting the contest outcome. This

allows the advantaged player to reduce effort too,while maintaining a high expected value from
the prize. Thus, the equilibrium results are consistent with the long-standing observation in

U.S. politics that themajor parties invest only in competitive races. Asymmetries in terms of the
contest success function (perhaps imparted by name recognition or other perquisites of
incumbency) might reduce aggregate rent-seeking effortby limiting the number of competitive
contests.

In the next section, the models
subjects

inexperienced

a one-shot

with

are put
design,

to an experimental test.With

separate

treatments

effort choices for each contest success function. Because

were

conducted

the use of
to analyze

early movers did not free ride in the

case of substitutable effort levels and because this result could have been influenced by the one
shot nature of the design, I also conducted a multiperiod
experience

on

subject

3. Experimental

decision

Design,

treatment to examine the effects of

making.

Procedures,

and Results

subjects were paid volunteers recruited from the undergraduate population at
American University. Before volunteering, subjects received an e-mail invitation to
All

participate in a decision-making exercise. The invitation indicated that participants would
be paid a $5 "show up" fee in addition to an amount that would depend on their decisions

and the decisions of others in the experiment. All payments were made in cash, privately, at
the end of the experimental session. On arrival at the experiment site, subjects were seated
and given the experiment instructions (reproduced in the Appendix), which can be
summarized

as

follows.
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1

All participants were endowed with $6 that could be used to purchase raffle tickets for
a monetary prize of $4. Tickets for the rafflecost $0.25. Subjects were informed theywould be
decisions

making

in

a

"team

raffle"

environment

wherein

each

team

of

consisted

two

participants. One member of each teamwas referred to as a stage 1 participant and the other as
a stage 2 participant. Each team was matched against one other team, so that each stage 1

participant had a stage 1 opponent, a stage 2 teammate, and a stage 2 opponent. All pairing of
participants was random and anonymous in the sense that subjects were never informed of the
identityof their teammate or either of their opponents.
Separate $4 prizes were awarded to each member of the winning team. Before making
decisions, subjects were told that the probability associated with their team winning the prize

was

Probability

your

.,

team wins

,

.

M.
the prize =

(Number of tickets your team buys)
(Total number of tickets bought by
your

team

and

your

opponent's

team)

In addition, subjects were given access to payoff tables that indicated the expected prize amount
associated with different combinations of team ticket purchases.
Stage 1 participants made their ticket purchase decisions first, indicating the desired
amount on a decision sheet included with the instructions.After making theirchoices, the stage
1 decision sheets were collected, and the decision sheets of each stage 2 participant were
to include the number of tickets purchased by their stage 1 teammate and stage 1
opponent. Next, stage 2 participants indicated the number of tickets theywished to purchase by

updated

filling in the desired amount on their decision sheet, and the stage 2 decision sheets were
collected. Each subject's decision sheetwas updated to include all decisions made by a subject's
teammate

or opponents.

After

entering

the decisions

in a computer,

the raffles were

conducted

using a computerized random number generator thatmade the draws using the probabilities
associated with subject ticket purchases, and the results were recorded on subject decision
sheets. Subjects were then individually called out of the room, shown their decision sheet, and
paid in cash their experimental earnings. Earnings consisted of the $5 show up fee, the portion
of the $6 endowment not spent on tickets, and the $4 prize ifapplicable.
To put the experimental results in context, it is important to emphasize the one-shot

nature of team rent-seeking 1 (TRS1). Subjects were inexperienced with the design, and were
not given the opportunity to engage in repeated play. This issue is addressed in themultiperiod
experiments described in a later section. Although the one-shot design puts the theory to
a difficult test, it has the advantage of being short, generating statistically independent
observations, and eliminating the potential for strategic spillovers across periods.

Resultsfor TRS1
A total of 68 subjects participated in the TRS1 treatment in four sessions with about 16
subjects per session.4 The 34 stage 1 and 34 stage 2 subjects made ticketpurchase decisions for
a total of 17 separate contests. Each session lasted approximately 35 minutes, and average
4

One

session had 20 subjects.
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Figure

1. TRS1

Ticket

Purchases

earnings (inclusive of the $5 participation fee) for the stage 1 and stage 2 participants were
$11.15 and $10.77, respectively. For this treatment, the subgame perfectNash equilibrium has
all stage 1 participants purchase zero tickets and all stage 2 participants purchase four tickets.
Figure 1 displays the frequency distribution for ticket purchases for theTRS1 treatment.
As the distribution shows, the data do not support the equilibrium point predictions. The
average and mode of stage 1 ticketpurchases (7.41 and 4, respectively) were much higher than
the equilibrium prediction of zero. The average and mode of stage 2 purchases (8.85 and 4)
were also high. Although positive expenditures in the first stage make it inappropriate to
compare second-stage expenditures to the equilibrium prediction, comparison of second-stage
ticket purchases relative to "best responses" is informative. For the parameters of this
treatment, it is never a best response for total team ticket purchases to exceed four. Thus, if
a stage 1 teammate buys four or more tickets, the best response (given nonnegativity of
purchases) for their stage 2 teammate is to purchase zero tickets.Also, for the parameters of
this treatment, the best response to a stage 1 opponent's purchase of 15 or more tickets is to
purchase zero tickets (irrespective of stage 1 teammate's ticket purchase). Of the 27 stage 2
subjects whose best response was 0, only four actually purchased zero tickets. The results
clearly indicate that first- and second-stage participants overinvest relative to the Nash
prediction. This result is consistent with the experimental results of themajority of previous
two-person rent-seeking contests, and the literature on "bubbles" and false equilibria (see
Sunder [1995] or Smith, Suchanek, and Williams [1988] for examples).
Interestingly,although the average stage 2 ticketpurchase was higher, differences in stage
1 and 2 ticketpurchases are not statistically significant (Wilcoxon/? = 0.432). This suggests that
the stage 1 players did not exploit their strategic opportunity to free ride. Failure to do so is
consistent with the results of several experiments on public goods (Isaac and Walker 1988) and
could illustrate concerns for other participant's payoffs as in Levine (1998). In particular, the
team-oriented aspect of the game might have led subjects to increase purchases so that their
teammate

had

a greater

chance

to receive

the prize.

Alternatively,

and

as

stated

above,

the one

shot nature of design might not have given subjects the opportunity to learn to free ride because
there was

no

repeated

play.

Furthermore, although the data indicate that stage 2 ticket purchases were not best
responses, insight into the behavior of the stage 2 subjects can be gained by breaking ticket
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1. OLS Regression Output; Dependent Variable:

Table

VariableCoefficient Estimate

AM
SITE-0.08
-1.66
SIOPP
-28.26
OPPZERO
-33.46
OPPMOD
1.98
39.940.025

X OPPMOD
SIOPP
Constant

93

S2 Ticket Purchase

p-Value

VIF

1.39
0.739
21.48
27.69
45.91
0.058
13.68

0.087
0.106
0.065

I?_016_
purchases into the following categories: zero, moderate (defined as 1-14), and high (defined as
15-24). Although the choice of 15 tickets as the cutoff point between themoderate and high
categories is somewhat arbitrary, note that the best response for a stage 1 player to an

opponent's purchase of 15-24 is 0. In other words, ticket purchases are classified as "high" if
they are sufficient to keep a rational stage 2 opponent from participating in the contest.5
Table 1 displays the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of stage 2 ticket
stage 1 opponent purchases (SIOPP),
purchases on stage 1 teammate purchases (SITEAM),
or in
intercept dummies for whether the stage 1 opponent purchase was 0 (OPPZERO)
a moderate range (OPPMOD),
Note that the
and an interaction term (SIOPP X OPPMOD).
baseline case for this specification is a subject whose stage 1 opponent made high purchases.6
The coefficient estimates indicate that in the case of high participation, an increase in
a stage 1 opponent's purchase led to a decrease in the stage 2 subject's purchase. Relative to the

case of high participation, the OPPZERO
coefficient indicates stage 2 purchases were lower
when the stage 1 opponent purchased zero tickets, and the estimated coefficient on the
interaction term indicates that in cases of moderate

participation (1-14 tickets purchased),
increases in a stage 1 opponent's purchases led to increases in stage 2 ticket purchases. A
limitation of this specification is the collinearity between the stage 1 opponent's ticketpurchase
variables (as indicated by the high variance inflation factors [VIFs] reported inTable 1). The
severe collinearity might help explain why the coefficient estimates achieve only marginal
statistical significance (with a range of p = 0.05-0.11).
Although the data clearly indicate overinvestment by stage 2 participants relative to their
best

responses,

purchases

over

the regression
one

range

and

results

suggest

decreasing

over

the pattern
a second,

of purchases
higher

range

(increasing

in opponent's

of opponent's

purchases)

is consistent with the shape of the theoretical best response functions. This is also reflected in
the regression estimates of the specification presented in Table 2, which includes the squared
in addition to SI TEAM, OPPZERO,
and
value of a stage 1 opponent's purchases (SIOPP2)
SIOPP.
and negative coefficient
Note, in particular, the positive estimated coefficient for SIOPP
on SIOPP2. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients suggests that the turning point is

5
Also, subjects buying more than 15 tickets spent as much or more on tickets as the value of the prize, which is irrational
if subjects only care about their own earnings.
6
Alternative specifications using a stage 1 teammate's purchases (zero, moderate, and high) or both stage 1 teammate's
and stage 1 opponent's purchases generate coefficient estimates that are qualitatively similar but are not statistically
significant. Although
variable bias.

the coefficient estimate is not significant, the SI TEAM

variable

is included to avoid an omitted
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Table

2. OLS Regression Output; Dependent Variable:
VariableCoefficient Estimate

VIF

/?-Value

SI TEAM
-0.01
OPPZERO
9.71
1.54
SIOPP
-0.06
SIOPP2
1.560.775

Constant

S2 Ticket Purchase

0.959
0.085
0.085
0.089

1.36
2.88
18.46
13.19

^_013_
14 tickets.7 Taken

around

as a whole,

the results offer limited support for the model

predictions.

One-Shot

Treatments:

Team Rent-Seeking

2

The same procedures were used for the team rent-seeking 2 (TRS2)
contest success function was changed to
^

, t

your

Probability

.,.

.

team wins

.

the prize =

treatment, but the

of your team)
(Weighted ticket
purchases
.
, . 1 ^-:-?-.
/r_ , t-.
(Total weighted ticketpurchases of
your

team

and

your

opponent's

team)

Weighted ticket purchases for a team was defined as the number of tickets purchased by the
stage 1 participant multiplied by the stage 2 purchases of their teammate (which is functionally
equivalent to the second contest success function used in the theory section). The value of the
endowment, prize, cost of ticketpurchases, and sequencing of decisions remained as inTRS1.

Resultsfor TRS2
A total of 76 subjects participated in the TRS2 treatment in four sessions with about 20
subjects per session.8 The 38 stage 1 and 38 stage 2 subjects made ticket purchase decisions for
a total of 19 separate contests. Each session lasted approximately 35 minutes, and average

earnings (inclusive of the $5 participation fee) for the stage 1 and stage 2 participants were
$10.30 and $10.86, respectively. For this treatment, theNash equilibrium has all participants
purchase four tickets. Figure 2 displays the frequency distribution for ticket purchases for the
TRS2

treatment.

Similar to the results from TRS1, the data display significant overinvestment relative to
the equilibrium prediction.9 For stage 1 participants, themean and mode of ticket purchases
were 10.79 and 8, respectively, and for stage 2 participants themean and mode were 8.57 and 4.
are not
and TRS2
Importantly, although the point predictions from both TRS1
supported, average stage 1 ticket purchases did rise from 7.41 inTRS1

to 10.79 inTRS2,

and

7
Note

also that no stage 1 subject purchased 13, 14, or 15 tickets. Thus, altering the specification presented inTable 1 so
that high purchases are defined as 14-24 (which would be consistent with the turning point estimated inTable 2) does
not influence the regression results.

8
One session had 16 subjects.
9
Given the parameters for this treatment, themaximum ticket purchase consistent with the best response functions in
stage 2 is four (this occurs when both stage 1 players buy the same number of tickets). Comparing actual stage 2
purchases with the best responses shows that 30 of the 38 stage 2 participants overinvested relative to the best response.
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the difference is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney p = 0.019). Thus, although
overinvestment relative to the Nash prediction was significant in both treatments, the
qualitative theoretical prediction regarding an increase in stage 1purchases is supported by the
data. Intuitively, subjects exerted more effortwhen a teammate's effortwas a complement to
rather than a substitute for own effort.

As with the TRS1 treatment, stage 2 ticket purchases, although not best responses,
displayed consistent patterns. Table 3 reports the results of a regression of stage 2 ticket
purchases on the stage 1 purchases of opponent (SIOPP) and teammate (SI TEAM), as well as
a dummy variable forwhether the stage 1 teammate's purchases were moderate (TMMOD = 1
if stage 1 ticketpurchase is between 1 and 14) and an interaction term (S1TM X TMMOD).10
The coefficient estimates and significance results suggest stage 2 purchases were responsive

to a stage 1 teammate's purchase. Holding constant the effectof a stage 1 opponent's purchase,
an increase in stage 1 teammate's purchases led to a decrease in ticket purchases by stage 2

participants. The coefficient on the interaction term suggests the effectof an increase in stage 1
purchases was less severe in themoderate range, but still negative (the sum of coefficients on
and the interaction term is negative). It is interesting that stage 2 purchases varied in
a statistically significantway with the stage 1 opponent's purchase for TRS1 and the stage 1
teammate's purchase forTRS2. It could be thatwhen teammember effort is a perfect substitute

SI TEAM

10
Alternative

specifications, with a stage 1 opponent's purchases in categories (moderate and high) or with the use of the
difference or ratio of stage 1 opponent and teammate purchases, generate coefficient estimates that are not statistically
variable is included to avoid an omitted
significant. Although the coefficient estimate is not significant, the SIOPP
variable bias.

Table

3. OLS Regression Output; Dependent Variable:
Variable

S1TMX
TMMOD
Constant

Coefficient Estimate

SIOPP
0.06
SI TEAM
-1.24
TMMOD
-23.68
1.17
32.360.005
R2 0.169

S2 Ticket Purchase

p-Value

0.020
0.033
0.056

VIF

1.04
0.680
13.52
28.67
9.35
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Table

4. OLS Regression Output; Dependent Variable:
Variable

Coefficient Estimate

S2 Ticket Purchase
p-Value

oc 2.967 0.812
ADV 3.74 0.696
ADV Xa -8.91
0.613
Constant 8.27 0.053
R2 0.02
stage 2 subjects focused on canceling out the stage 1 opponent's effort.
Alternatively, complementarities in effort decisions associated with TRS2 might have led
(as in TRS1),

subjects

to respond

to own

teammate's

purchases.

An alternative econometric specification for stage 2 purchases can be tied directly to the
theoretical model. The model suggests stage 2 ticket purchases should reach their peak when
oc= Vi (with ocdefined as a stage 1 teammate's purchase divided by total stage 1 purchases). If
a stage 2 participant is at a disadvantage (oc<
lA), increases in oc should lead to greater
expenditures because theymake the contestmore competitive. Alternatively, for an advantaged
stage 2 participant, increases in ocabove lAmake the contest less competitive and allow for

a reduction in purchases. Table 4 presents the results of a regression of stage 2 purchases on oc,
a dummy variable forwhether the stage 2 subject was advantaged (ADV=
1 ifa > Vi), and an
interaction term (ADV X oc).
Although the signs of the estimated coefficients are consistent with the theory,none of the
estimated coefficients are statistically significant.Unfortunately, although therewas significant
variation in stage 1 ticket purchases (and as such in oc), in no contest did stage 1 participants

purchase an identical number of tickets. This makes it difficult to assess whether first-stage
asymmetries reduce rent-seeking effort in the second stage (as predicted by themodel). Several
other aspects of theTRS2 treatment could explain the lack of statistically significant results. In
particular,

the two-stage

nature

of

the game,

which

introduces

a "team"-oriented

component,

could lead stage 2 participants to respond directly to a teammate's or opponent's action rather
than consider how these actions influence themarginal benefit and cost of ticketpurchases. As
suggested earlier, the presence of teammates might also highlight concerns for other
participants' payoffs. Finally, the lack of repeated play or subjects who were experienced
with the institutionmight have increased the variance associated with subject decision making,
leading to coefficient estimates that are not statistically significant.
Discussion

of One-Shot

Results

Several aspects of the experimental results from the one-shot treatments support
theoretical predictions. Stage 1 ticket purchases were higher when team member effort served
as a complement, and the differences in stage 1 ticketpurchases between TRS1 and TRS2 are

statistically significant. Stage 2 ticket purchases, although high relative to best responses, were
broadly consistent with the shape of the best response functions. However, the lack of free
riding associated with stage 1 ticket purchases in TRS1 is surprising and not consistent with

theoretical predictions. As noted earlier, this could have been related to the one-shot nature of
and the reliance on inexperienced subjects. To investigate whether experience with the
institution and opportunities for repeated play would influence the free riding result, I

TRS1

conducted the following multiperiod

treatment.
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Treatment for TRS1

For themultiperiod treatment, the stage game described inTRS1 (which used the contest
success function for which team member effortswere perfect substitutes) was repeated for
a total of eight periods. The following modifications were made to the parameter values. In
each period, participants were endowed with $2.00 that could be used to purchase $0.10 raffle
tickets for a monetary prize of $1.60. The periods were independent in the sense that subjects

could not use earnings from prior rounds to purchase tickets in any subsequent round. To give
subjects experience with a particular role, they were assigned to be a stage 1 or stage 2

for the duration of the experiment. However, subjects were randomly and
anonymously repaired at the beginning of each period to determine teammates and opponents
and were never informed of the identity of any of their teammates or opponents. At the
beginning of each period, stage 1 participants indicated the number of tickets theywanted to

participant

purchase on their decision sheets, the sheets were collected and the informationwas recorded
on the stage 2 decision sheets,which were then distributed. Stage 2 participants indicated their
ticket purchase decision, their decision sheets were collected, and the raffleswere conducted
with a computerized random number generator. Subject decision sheets were updated to
include all information regarding teammate and opponent ticketpurchases, whether their team

won the raffle,and their earnings from the period. The stage 1 decision sheets were returned,
and the second period began (with a random and anonymous rematching of subjects). At the
conclusion of the eighth period, subjects were individually called out of the room and paid in
cash their experimental earnings, which were the sum of earnings in the eight periods, plus a $5
show-up

fee.

Results from

theMultiperiod

Treatment

A total of 48 subjects participated in theTRS1 treatment, in three sessions with 16 subjects
session.
The 24 stage 1 and 24 stage 2 subjectsmade ticketpurchase decisions for a total of
per
96 separate contests. Each session lasted approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes, and average
earnings (inclusive of the $5 participation fee) for the stage 1 and stage 2 participants were
$22.50 and $23.58, respectively. In each period, the subgame perfectNash equilibrium for this
treatmenthas all stage 1 participants purchase zero tickets and all stage 2 participants purchase

four tickets. Figure 3 displays
multiperiod treatment.

the frequency distribution for ticket purchases

for the

Similar to previous results, the data display significant overinvestment relative to theNash
equilibrium prediction. Average ticketpurchases for stage 1 and stage 2 participants were 6.13
and 4.77, respectively. However, of the 192 separate decisions for stage 1 participants, 33

(approximately 17%) were 0, and for stage 2 participants, 49 of 192 (approximately 26%) were
best responses. Because these percentages are higher than those for the TRS1 and TRS2
treatments, it seems that experience with the institutionmight have influenced play for some

subjects. Given the experience generated by repeated play, it is useful to analyze ticket
purchases by round. Figure 4 displays the average ticket purchase for stage 1 and stage 2
participants by round.
The data clearly demonstrate that stage 1 participants did not exploit their free riding
opportunity, even with the experience generated by repeated play. Although average ticket
purchases for stage 1participants declined over the course of the experiment (a result consistent
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with several rent-seeking experiments using simultaneous decision making over multiple
periods), average ticket purchases for stage 1 participants were higher than average ticket
purchases for stage 2 participants in each round. Over the final four rounds of the experiment,

differences in stage 1 and stage 2 ticket purchases were not statistically significant (Mann
=
0.317). This reinforces the results obtained in TRS1; significant levels of free
Whitney p
even
occur
when subjects are experienced with the institution.
riding
As was the case with TRS1, although stage 2 participants did not "best respond" in a game
theoretic sense, their purchases were broadly consistent with the shape of best response
functions. Table 5 displays the results of a regression of stage 2 ticketpurchases in a period on

Stage 1Average
Purchase

Stage 2 Average
Purchase

Figure

4. Average

Ticket

Purchases

by Round
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S2 Ticket Purchase

Variable Coefficient Estimate /7-Value

PROB

OWN-1 0.22 0.010
PROBWIN 0.663 0.109
-0.07 0.043
RD 0.14 0.434
1.18 0.187
SESSIONI
0.50 0.571
SESSION2
Constant 1.78 0.146
R2 0.11

WIN2

lagged ticketpurchases (OWN-I),11 the probability a player would win the contest ifboth stage
2 players bought zero tickets (PROBWIN = stage 1 teammate purchase/total purchase of stage
1 teammate and opponent) and this value squared (PROBWIN2), and round (RD) and dummy
variables for the experimental session the subject participated in (SESSION
I, SESSION
2).
The coefficient estimates and significance results for the PROBWIN
and PROBWIN2
terms suggest stage 2 ticketpurchases and PROBWIN varied according to an invertedU shape,
which is consistent with the intuition that subjects exert greater effort in close contests. Note
also that the coefficient estimates on session are not significant, nor is the round coefficient.12
Taken as a whole, the results from themultiperiod treatment reinforce those fromTRS1. The
lack of free riding associated with stage 1 ticketpurchases does not appear to be an artifact of
subject experience, and might be related to the team-oriented nature of the contests. Although
stage 2 purchases were high relative to best responses, stage 2 subjects appear to have
responded to the competitiveness of the contest.

4. Conclusion
This

research extends

experimentally
contest

success

testing
function

a

the basic

team-oriented
are used

approach
two-stage

to model

cases

in Tullock

rent-seeking
wherein

(1980)

model.

team member

and

by developing

Separate
effort

variants
serves

of

the

as a perfect

substitute or complement. The model ismotivated by the observation that rent-seeking for
public policy favorsmight affectmultiple constituencies simultaneously, and formany issues,
multiple

groups

share

a preference

on

either

side

of an

issue. Moreover,

when

various

groups

exert effort independently and at different times, the sequencing of effort choices might have
important effects on contest outcomes. Congressional races in theUnited States provide one
example in which a contest prize goes to multiple groups (a candidate and that candidate's
party), and the sequencing of effortdecisions plays an important role in shaping the contest
outcome.

11
This variable helps to control for subject-specific effects. An alternative specification that uses dummy variables to
induce subject-specific fixed effects results in parameter estimates and significance results that are consistent with
those in Table 5.
12
Note, however, that the effects of learning are captured in the OWN-1 coefficient. The point estimate for this
coefficient (0.22) suggests that, controlling for the other included variables, subjects reduced their ticket purchases
over the course of the experiment.
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The

suggests

theory

that when

effort

levels

serve

as

substitutes,

perfect

early

actors

can

free

ride on the effortsof thosemoving later, introducing collective action problems similar to those
affectingpublic goods provision. Incentives to free ride are mitigated when early effort serves as
a complement to later effort.This
an

create

advantage

for

a

later

is particularly relevant when asymmetries in early effort
moving

competitor.

In

these

the model

cases,

predicts

asymmetries in early effort that generate reductions in late effort.
Experimental methods are used to test the theory, and data from the experiments provide
limited support for the theory. Stage 1 participants in the TRS1 treatment (in which team
member efforts are substitutes) purchased fewer tickets than those in the TRS2 treatment
(which models complementarities), and differences in ticket purchases are statistically
significant.However, the free riding prediction associated with the contest success function,
forwhich team member effort serves as a perfect substitute, is not supported by the data. In
both the one-shot and multiperiod treatments, stage 1 participants purchased a significant
number of tickets, and differences in ticket purchases between stage 1 and stage 2 participants

were not statistically significant. The lack of free riding in late rounds of the multiperiod
treatment suggests that experience is not an explanation for this result.Although this finding
merits

further

research,

the team-oriented

nature

of

the contests

may

be

an

important

element

in subject decision making. One possibility for future research would be to investigatewhether
subjects learned to free ride in an environment in which theywere matched with the same
teammate and opponents over the course of the experiment. In addition, providing subjects
with more experience by extending the multiperiod treatment past eight rounds might,
eventually, lead to subject play that is consistent with theoretical predictions. Nonetheless,
results from the current set of experiments provide interesting insights into subject play in team
contests.

oriented

In terms of stage 2 effortchoices, the data suggest subjects responded to decisions made in
the first stage. For the TRS1 treatment, stage 2 purchases tended to be lower when a stage 1
opponent purchased either zero tickets or a high number of tickets. In the TRS2 treatment,

ticketpurchases of stage 2 subjects declined as those of their teammate increased, and this effect
was particularly strongwhen a stage 1 teammate purchased a high number of tickets.Finally, in
themultiperiod treatment, stage 2 participants appear to have responded to the competitiveness
of

the contest.

made

Consistent

with

the results

from many

significant overinvestments relative to theNash

other

rent-seeking

experiments,

subjects

equilibrium prediction in all treatments.

Appendix
Instructions for TRS1
is an experimental study of decision making. All of themoney you earn from the experiment is yours to keep.
earnings will be paid to you in cash, privately and confidentially, immediately after the experiment. Now that the
experiment has begun, please do not talk.
This

Your

Introduction
1" participant. For the purposes of the
The experiment will be conducted in two stages. You are a "STAGE
1 participant, who will be referred to
experiment, you will be randomly and anonymously paired with one other STAGE
2" participants,
as your "opponent." You will also be randomly and anonymously paired with two separate "STAGE
one who is on "your team" and one who is on your "opponent's team." Importantly, you will not be told who you are
paired with or against, and decisions will be made anonymously in the sense that no participant will be able to identify
the decision of any other participant.
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Conducting theExperiment
All participants begin the experiment with $6.00, and will decide how many "raffle" tickets to purchase. Each
ticketwill cost 250. Because each participant begins with $6.00 and each ticket costs 250, each participant can purchase
0-24 tickets. The raffle prize is $4.00, and will be awarded to each member of thewinning team. This means that ifyour
team wins the raffle, you will be awarded $4.00. You will indicate how many tickets you wish to purchase by writing the
desired amount on the attached decision sheet. The rafflewill be conducted as follows:
1" participants make their ticket purchase decisions, the experimenter will collect the decision
sheets will be randomly and anonymously paired (this will determine your opponent). The
experimenter will record the number of tickets you and your opponent chose to purchase on the decision sheets of two
1 participant on your team"
randomly selected STAGE 2 players, under the headings "tickets purchased by theSTAGE
After all "STAGE

sheets. The

decision

and "tickets purchased by the STAGE
1 participant on your opponent's team.'"
Next the experimenter will distribute the STAGE 2 decision sheets. After viewing the number of tickets purchased
1 players on their team and on their opponent's team, the STAGE 2 participants will decide how many
by the STAGE
tickets to purchase. After all STAGE
2 participants have indicated the number of tickets they wish to purchase, the
1 decision sheets will then be updated to reflect the
experimenter will collect the STAGE 2 decision sheets. The STAGE
number of tickets purchased by team members and opponents.
Next, the experimenter will conduct the raffle.A computer-generated
wins the raffle. The probability that your team wins is
.
.
.
...
n
,
=
Probability your team wins the prize

random drawing will determine which team

(Number of tickets your team buys)
(Total number of tickets bought by
your team and your opponent's

team)

members of thewinning team will receive separate $4.00 prizes. If neither team buys any tickets, the prize will be
awarded randomly, with each team having an equal chance of winning the prize.

BOTH

Expected Earnings
Your expected earnings (in dollars) are equal to the $6.00 endowment minus the amount you spend buying tickets
plus the probability your team wins the prize times $4.00 (the amount of the prize).
Expected Earnings

= $6.00 ?

(amount you spend buying tickets) 4- (probability your team wins the prize x $4.00)

Included with these instructions is a table that lists the "expected prize" for your group associated with different
of group ticket purchases. Note that this table does not list your expected earnings because it does not
include the $6 endowment or the amount you spend on tickets.

combinations

It is important to remember that the expected prize is based on the probability your team wins the prize. Your
actual earnings are dependent on whether you win the prize or not. You can think of the expected prize as an average
prize amount awarded ifwe repeated the rafflemany times using the same probability that your team wins the prize each
time.
The

table is provided

to help you make

your decision. Feel free to take time to study the sheet before you make

a decision.
Actual Earnings
Your earnings will be the part of your $6.00 endowment
team wins.

that is not spent on tickets, plus the $4.00 prize ifyour

PLEASE INDICATE THE NUMBER OF TICKETS YOU WISH TO PURCHASE BY FILLING IN THE
DESIRED

AMOUNT

ON YOUR

DECISION

SHEET.

Instructions for TRS2
This is an experimental study of decision making. All of themoney you earn from the experiment is yours to keep.
earnings will be paid to you in cash, privately and confidentially, immediately after the experiment. Now that the
experiment has begun, please do not talk.

Your

Introduction
The experiment will be conducted in two stages. You are a "STAGE
1" participant. For the purposes of the
1 participant, who will be referred to
experiment, you will be randomly and anonymously paired with one other STAGE
as your "opponent." You will also be randomly and anonymously paired with two separate "STAGE
2" participants,
one who is on "your team" and one who is on your "opponent's team." Importantly, you will not be told who you are
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paired with or against, and decisions will be made anonymously in the sense that no participant will be able to identify
the decision of any other participant.
The experiment is a "weighted" raffle for a prize of $4.00. Separate raffleprizes will be awarded to each member of
the winning team. This means that ifyour team wins the raffle, you will be awarded $4.00. The probability your team
wins the prize is:
?,,.,.
,
= (Weighted ticket purchases of your team)
Probability your team wins the prize ?=?=-?.?r-r-:-:-~-.
(Total weighted ticket purchases of
your team and your opponent's

team)

Weighted ticket purchases for each team will be determined according to a process described below. They are the
1 has a weight of w and ticket purchases
product of a weight and an amount of tickets purchased. For example, ifTEAM
1 equal w*x . If TEAM
2 has a weight of y and ticket purchases of z, their
of x, weighted ticket purchases for TEAM

1wins the raffle is w*x/(w*x + y*z), and the
be y*z .This means the probability TEAM
+
2
TEAM
wins
is
y*zl(w*x
y*z).
probability
If theweights for both teams are zero or ticket purchases for both teams are zero, the raffle prize will be awarded
randomly, with both teams having an equal chance of winning the prize.

weighted

ticket purchases would

Conducting theExperiment
All participants begin the experiment with $6.00. In Stage 1 of the experiment, the weights for the rafflewill be
determined. In Stage 2 of the experiment, ticket purchases will be determined.
Stage 1 participants will indicate the weight they choose for their team's ticket purchases on their decision sheet.
1 unit increase in theweight will cost 250. Because each participant begins with $6.00 and each unit costs 250, Stage
1 participants can choose a weight of 0-24.

Each

After all Stage 1 participants make their decisions, the experimenter will collect the decision sheets. The decision
sheets will be randomly and anonymously paired. The experimenter will record theweights chosen on the decision sheets
1
of two randomly selected Stage 2 players, under the headings "weight for your ticketpurchases chosen by the STAGE
1 participant on your
participant on your team" and "weight for your opponent's ticketspurchases chosen by the STAGE
opponent's team."
Next the experimenter will distribute the Stage 2 decision sheets. After viewing theweights, the Stage 2 participants
will decide how many tickets to purchase, each of which costs the Stage 2 participant 250. Because each participant
begins with $6.00 and each ticket costs 250, Stage 2 participants can purchase 0-24 tickets. After all Stage 2 participants
have indicated the number of tickets theywish to purchase, the experimenter will collect the Stage 2 decision sheets. The
Stage 1 decision sheets will then be updated to reflect the number of tickets purchased by team members and opponents.
Once theweights and ticket purchases have been determined, the experimenter will conduct the raffle.A computer
generated random drawing will determine which

team wins the raffle.

Expected Earnings
Because you are a STAGE

1participant, your decisions will determine theweight for your team's ticket purchases.
expected earnings (in dollars) are equal to the $6.00 endowment minus the amount you spend on theweight plus the
probability your team wins the prize times $4.00 (the amount of the prize).

Your

Expected Earnings

= $6.00?

(amount you spend on theweight) +

(probability your team wins the prize x $4.00)

Included with these instructions is a table that lists the "expected prize" for your group associated with different
of weighted group ticket purchases. Note that this table does not list your expected earnings because it

combinations

does not include the $6 endowment or the amount you spend on the weight.
It is important to remember that the expected prize is based on the probability your team wins the prize. Your
actual earnings are dependent on whether you win the prize or not. You can think of the expected prize as an average
prize amount awarded
time.
The

ifwe repeated the rafflemany

table is provided

to help you make

times using the same probability

that your team wins the prize each

your decision. Feel free to take time to study the sheet before you make

a decision.
Actual Earnings
Your earnings will be the part of your $6.00 endowment
team wins.

that is not spent on weight, plus the $4.00 prize ifyour
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